Private Credit in Family Office Portfolios: Structures, Liquidity Terms and Due Diligence

The allocator that reads the prospectus last

When a family office looks at a private credit fund, the yield is the least interesting number on the page. What its investment committee wants to know is what happens on the worst day: who gets paid first when redemptions exceed the cap, who decides the marks, how much borrowed money sits underneath the net asset value, and how many layers of fees separate the gross coupon on a middle-market loan from the cash that reaches the family's account.

The questions have become sharper since late 2025. Two widely covered bankruptcies, a public BDC that reported net asset value per share of $7.07 at the end of 2025, down from $8.71 a quarter earlier, a non-traded BDC that said it would replace quarterly tender offers with return-of-capital distributions, and Blackstone's $77.2 billion private credit fund holding to its 5% quarterly cap while roughly 10% of shares were tendered: these are now standard reference points in family office credit committees.

This analysis is written for the managers and RIAs who sit across the table from those committees. It covers the vehicles family offices use to hold private credit, the regulatory mechanics behind each liquidity promise, the fee and leverage layers, the documented stress points of 2025 and 2026, and the diligence questions a credit manager should expect.

Our earlier piece, Private Credit's Liquidity Reckoning, covered distribution to RIAs. This one looks at the family office as the investor doing the underwriting.

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Part I: How much private credit family offices actually hold

What the published surveys say

Survey data on family office credit allocations is thinner than the volume of commentary suggests. Three bank surveys are worth citing precisely.

UBS Global Family Office Report 2025. UBS surveyed 317 of its family office clients online between 22 January and 4 April 2025. The average net worth of participating families was USD 2.7 billion. The report found that average private debt allocations doubled to 4% in 2024, up from 2% the previous year, and that family offices planning to change their allocations in 2025 intended to raise private debt further, to 5%. Looking five years out, 30% of respondents anticipated a significant or moderate increase in private debt.

The same report captured the skepticism that sits alongside that growth. The general manager and CIO of a European single family office told UBS that private debt "is a relatively new asset class – it's fashionable, and everyone wants a piece of it to chase yield and lock in higher fixed returns," adding: "But we remain cautious and are not yet convinced by the risk-return characteristics."

Goldman Sachs Family Office Investment Insights 2025. Goldman Sachs' report, published in September 2025 and covering 245 institutional family offices, showed private credit at 4% of portfolios in 2025, up from 3% in 2023.

J.P. Morgan Private Bank 2026 Global Family Office Report. J.P. Morgan's 2026 report reflects the views of 333 family offices across 30 countries. According to a summary of the report's allocation data published by Chief Investment Officer magazine in August 2026, the survey (conducted from May through July 2025) placed private credit at 2.4% of the average portfolio, within a private investments allocation of 30.8%.

Reading the numbers correctly

Three things stand out for a manager.

First, private credit is a single-digit average allocation in every one of these surveys. That matters for ticket sizes, for the number of managers an office will hire, and for how much diligence time it will spend per manager.

Second, averages hide dispersion. A family whose wealth came from lending, real estate or financial services may run a credit book far above the average; a founder family with a concentrated equity stake may hold almost none. The UBS 2025 report notes that 79% of its respondent families still have an active operating business, and that operating business often shapes what kind of credit risk the family is comfortable owning.

Third, the trend is up but the conviction is conditional, as the UBS quote above shows. That is why the 2025-2026 stress points carry so much weight in diligence.

For managers mapping which offices have the staffing to underwrite credit directly, the family office directory is a starting point for segmenting by structure rather than headline wealth.

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Part II: The vehicle menu

Family offices hold private credit through at least six distinct structures. Each one answers the liquidity question differently, and each one is governed by a different body of law. Diligence starts by establishing which rulebook applies.

1. Closed-end drawdown funds

The traditional institutional vehicle is a private fund organized as a limited partnership, typically relying on an exemption from registration under the Investment Company Act of 1940. Investors commit capital, the manager calls it over an investment period, and the fund returns capital as loans repay, followed by a harvest period and wind-down.

Liquidity: none, by design. There is no redemption right. Exits come from distributions or from selling the LP interest on the secondary market, often at a discount and typically with general partner consent.

Why family offices like it: the absence of redemptions is also a protection. A drawdown fund cannot be forced to sell loans to meet withdrawals, and its term aligns with the life of the loans.

What the family must manage: unfunded commitments, which an over-committed office funds from earlier vintages' distributions until those slow.

2. Non-traded and perpetual BDCs

A business development company is a closed-end company that elects, under Section 54 of the Investment Company Act, to be subject to Sections 55 through 65 of that Act. Non-traded BDCs typically sell shares on a continuous basis and offer liquidity through periodic issuer tender offers rather than an exchange listing.

The 70% test. Under Section 55(a) of the Investment Company Act, a BDC may not acquire non-qualifying assets unless, at the time of the acquisition, qualifying assets (principally securities of eligible US portfolio companies, plus cash and government securities) represent at least 70% of the value of its total assets. This is why BDC portfolios center on US middle-market lending.

Leverage. Section 61 of the Investment Company Act sets a default asset coverage requirement of 200% for BDCs, meaning assets must be at least twice senior securities, roughly a 1:1 debt-to-equity limit. The Small Business Credit Availability Act, enacted as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (Pub. L. 115-141, signed on March 23, 2018), amended Section 61 through its Section 802 to allow a BDC to reduce that requirement to 150%, roughly a 2:1 debt-to-equity limit. The statute gives two routes:

• Board approval by the required majority of directors (as defined in Section 57(o), essentially a majority of the non-interested directors), effective one year after approval.
• Shareholder approval by more than 50% of votes cast at a meeting with a quorum, effective the first day after approval.

The BDC must disclose the approval within five business days and disclose its senior securities and asset coverage in each periodic filing. A BDC whose common equity is not listed on a national securities exchange must also offer to repurchase the shares of each shareholder as of the approval date, with 25% of those securities to be repurchased in each of the four calendar quarters following the approval quarter.

For a family office, the leverage ceiling is a legal maximum, not a target; diligence asks how close to it the fund has operated.

Liquidity: through quarterly issuer tender offers, which the board authorizes at its discretion. The 5% quarterly limit common in this market is a fund-level policy set out in offering documents, not a statutory entitlement. The tender itself is governed by Exchange Act Rule 13e-4 and Rule 14e-1, which require the offer to remain open for at least 20 business days; when tenders exceed the amount the issuer will buy, Rule 13e-4 requires purchases to be made as nearly as may be pro rata, subject to limited exceptions such as odd-lot priority and an additional purchase of up to 2% of the class.

3. Interval funds

An interval fund is a registered closed-end fund that adopts a fundamental policy to make periodic repurchase offers under Investment Company Act Rule 23c-3.

The mechanics of Rule 23c-3:

• Repurchase offers occur at a periodic interval of three, six or twelve months.
• Each repurchase offer must be for not less than 5% and not more than 25% of the common stock outstanding on the repurchase request deadline, with the amount set by the directors before each offer.
• If tenders exceed the offer amount, the fund may repurchase an additional amount of up to 2% of shares outstanding; beyond that, it must repurchase on a pro rata basis.
• Shareholders must be notified no less than 21 and no more than 42 days before each repurchase request deadline.
• The repurchase pricing date falls no later than the 14th day after the request deadline, and payment is due within seven days of the pricing date.
• From the notification until the pricing date, the fund must hold assets equal to at least 100% of the repurchase offer amount that can be sold or will mature by the payment deadline.
• Suspension or postponement requires a vote of a majority of directors, including a majority of the directors who are not interested persons, and is limited to specified circumstances, such as loss of regulated investment company status, a closed or restricted principal market, an emergency, or an SEC order.

The family office reading: the offer is mandatory once adopted, but its size is bounded. The fund must make the offer; it need not satisfy every request.

4. Tender-offer funds

A tender-offer fund is a registered closed-end fund that has not adopted a Rule 23c-3 policy. Like a non-traded BDC, it provides liquidity through discretionary issuer tender offers under Rule 13e-4. The board decides whether to make an offer in a given period and how large it will be.

Marketing materials for both often describe "quarterly liquidity of up to 5%." The legal difference is discretion. An interval fund that skips a repurchase offer needs a qualifying reason under Rule 23c-3. A tender-offer fund's board can simply decline to authorize one.

5. Separately managed accounts

Some larger family offices negotiate SMAs, or funds-of-one, with credit managers. The family owns the loans (directly or through a dedicated vehicle), sets its own concentration limits, and negotiates fees.

Liquidity: in practice, the liquidity of the underlying loans. An SMA removes the risk of other investors' redemptions, but it does not make illiquid loans liquid.

What the family takes on: custody, loan administration, valuation oversight and reporting, plus the question of how the manager allocates scarce deals between the SMA and its commingled funds.

6. Direct lending co-investments and asset-based finance

Co-investments let a family office invest alongside a manager's fund in a single loan, usually at reduced or no fees. For managers that also run BDCs or registered funds, the allocation of co-investment opportunities is governed by SEC exemptive relief from Sections 17(d) and 57(a)(4) of the Investment Company Act and Rule 17d-1. On April 29, 2025, the SEC issued an order to FS Credit Opportunities Corp. and affiliates (Release No. IC-35561) adopting a more principles-based co-investment framework that substantially reduced board approval requirements and permitted BDCs to invest in issuers where an affiliate, but not the BDC itself, is an existing investor, subject to conditions. A family office co-investing alongside a BDC should ask which order the manager relies on and how allocation decisions are documented.

Asset-based finance covers loans secured by pools of financial or hard assets: consumer and auto receivables, equipment, trade receivables, royalties, and similar collateral. Families with operating backgrounds in these sectors may find the collateral easier to underwrite than cash-flow loans. The diligence emphasis shifts from borrower EBITDA to collateral verification, servicing and the integrity of the borrowing base, a point the Tricolor and First Brands bankruptcies (Part V) made concrete.

Vehicle comparison

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Part III: What "5% quarterly" really means

Statutory floor versus fund policy

The phrase "5% per quarter" means different things in different vehicles.

In an interval fund with a 5% quarterly policy, 5% is the minimum the fund must offer each quarter under Rule 23c-3. The obligation to make the offer is fixed; the obligation to fully satisfy requests is not.

In a non-traded BDC or tender-offer fund, 5% is a ceiling the board has said it intends to observe. The board may tender for more, or less, or not at all. When Reuters reported on September 3, 2026 that the Blackstone Private Credit Fund would repurchase 5% of shares in the third quarter, it described 5% as "the customary threshold for such vehicles": a convention set by fund policy, not a legal requirement.

In a private drawdown fund, there is no quarterly liquidity at all.

How proration works in practice

Illustrative example. A hypothetical family office holds shares in a non-traded BDC. In a given quarter, the board authorizes a tender for 5% of outstanding shares. Shareholders holding 10% of the shares tender. Under the pro rata requirement of Rule 13e-4, each tendering shareholder receives cash for roughly half of the shares it tendered. The family's unaccepted shares remain invested at the fund's NAV, and the family must decide whether to tender again next quarter, joining whatever backlog of unfilled requests has built up.

The committee cares more about the second-order effect. When the fund pays out tenders in cash, it must source that cash from new subscriptions, loan repayments, borrowings or loan sales. If it sells loans, it is likely to sell the most liquid, best-marked positions first, leaving remaining investors with a portfolio that is less liquid and potentially of lower average quality. If it borrows, leverage rises against a smaller equity base. Either way, the investors who stay bear the cost of liquidity provided to those who leave.

The backlog effect

The September 2026 Reuters report on BCRED illustrates how this plays out at scale. The $77.2 billion fund received repurchase requests of about $4.3 billion, roughly 10% of shares, in the third quarter of 2026, compared with $4.5 billion of requests in the second quarter, of which it had fulfilled roughly half. That left about $2.3 billion of unfulfilled requests, a significant portion of which was resubmitted in the third-quarter tender. According to the report, investors who sought liquidity in the second and third quarters will have received an estimated 75% of their requested capital.

The fund did what its documents said it would do. The lesson is that "quarterly liquidity" in a perpetual vehicle is a queue whose length depends on every other investor, so an office that may need cash on a known date cannot treat semi-liquid credit as a liquidity reserve.

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Part IV: Fee layers

A drawdown fund, a perpetual BDC and an SMA carry very different fee stacks, and the headline management fee is rarely where the difference lies.

The layers to map

Management fee base. Some credit vehicles charge management fees on net assets, others on gross assets including assets financed with borrowed money, others on invested or committed capital. On a leveraged vehicle, a fee charged on gross assets grows as leverage grows, which creates an incentive the family office will want addressed in the fund's governance.

Income incentive fee. Many BDCs and many credit funds charge an incentive fee on net investment income above a hurdle, often with a catch-up. The family wants to know whether the hurdle is measured quarterly or over a longer look-back, and whether income that is accrued but not received in cash, including payment-in-kind interest, counts toward the fee.

Capital gains incentive fee. For BDCs, Section 205(b)(3) of the Investment Advisers Act permits a performance fee in the advisory contract only if it does not exceed 20% of realized capital gains, computed net of realized capital losses and unrealized capital depreciation, subject to further conditions in the statute.

Fund operating expenses. Administration, audit, legal and valuation costs, allocated by the limited partnership agreement in private funds and shown in the fee table of a registered fund's or BDC's registration statement.

Interest expense. On a leveraged vehicle, the cost of borrowing can be a large expense line that is easy to overlook when comparing "fees," and it makes a levered fund's net return profile very different from an unlevered SMA holding the same loans.

Distribution and servicing fees. Perpetual vehicles sold through wealth channels often offer several share classes; the family should establish which one it is being offered and whether an institutional class is available at its ticket size.

Platform, feeder and adviser fees. Feeder vehicles, platforms and any outsourced CIO or RIA each add a layer on top.

Why gross yield is the wrong comparison

A frequent diligence error is comparing a perpetual BDC's distribution yield with a drawdown fund's target net IRR, or with the gross coupon on a co-investment. The distribution yield of a perpetual vehicle can include return of capital, can be supported by leverage, and is stated after fees but before any adviser fee. A family office committee will ask the manager to put every option on the same basis: net of all fees and expenses, net of expected credit losses, unlevered and levered, and on the same holding period.

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Part V: The documented stress points, 2025-2026

The events below are drawn from SEC filings, company releases and major-outlet reporting. They are cited here for what they show about vehicle mechanics, not as judgments on any manager.

Tricolor and First Brands: collateral and off-balance-sheet risk (September 2025)

Tricolor Holdings, a subprime auto lender and used car dealer, filed for Chapter 7 liquidation on September 10, 2025, in the US Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas, together with 17 of its subsidiaries. In December 2025, the US Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York announced criminal charges against former Tricolor executives, including its founder and former chief executive, alleging among other things that the company had "double pledged" collateral to multiple lenders. On August 18, 2026, the SEC filed parallel civil fraud charges against three former executives, alleging that hundreds of millions of dollars of subprime auto loans had been double pledged to multiple asset-backed securities offerings and lenders. These are allegations; the charges against the former chief executive had not been resolved at the time of writing.

On September 28, 2025, auto parts maker First Brands Group filed for Chapter 11 in the US Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas; its petition placed liabilities in the $10 billion to $50 billion range, one of the standard bands used on Chapter 11 petitions. A refinancing attempted in August had been abandoned after lenders sought an independent review of the company's earnings and its extensive use of off-balance-sheet financing, particularly factoring agreements. A $1.1 billion debtor-in-possession package was arranged, with the court approving interim access to $500 million on October 1, 2025. In January 2026, federal prosecutors in Manhattan charged the company's former chief executive and another former senior executive with fraud, alleging, as reported by the Associated Press, that receivables were inflated and borrowed against two or three times without lenders' knowledge. Those charges are allegations and have not been proven in court.

The diligence lesson: both cases concern the integrity of collateral and the visibility of obligations outside the reported balance sheet, rather than ordinary credit deterioration. For asset-based finance in particular, managers should expect to be asked how the manager independently verifies collateral, whether it audits the borrowing base, how it detects the same asset being pledged to more than one lender, and how it monitors receivables financing at the borrower.

BlackRock TCP Capital: marks that moved suddenly (January to May 2026)

BlackRock TCP Capital Corp., a publicly traded BDC, reported in its fourth-quarter results release of February 27, 2026 that net asset value per share was $7.07 as of December 31, 2025, compared with $8.71 as of September 30, 2025, a 19% decline that the company attributed to issuer-specific developments. Its adviser waived $1.8 million of management fees for the fourth quarter, and non-accrual investments stood at 4.0% of the portfolio at fair value at year-end. In its first-quarter 2026 results, released on May 7, 2026, the company reported NAV per share of $6.72 as of March 31, 2026, a 4.9% decline to which it said $35 million of net portfolio markdowns contributed, and reported non-accrual investments at 2.8% of the portfolio at fair value, down from 4.0% at year-end.

The diligence lesson: the issue is not that loans were marked down, which is what fair value accounting is for, but how far marks moved in a single quarter. Expect requests for the history of marks on their largest positions, how many quarters a deteriorating loan sat near par before it was written down, and who signs off on valuation. For registered funds and BDCs, SEC Rule 2a-5 requires fair value to be determined in good faith by the board or by a board-designated valuation designee, typically the adviser, under a process that assesses valuation risks, applies and tests methodologies, and oversees pricing services.

Blue Owl Capital Corporation II: when the liquidity mechanism itself changes (November 2025 to April 2026)

When Blue Owl Capital Corporation II, a non-traded BDC, agreed to merge into the listed Blue Owl Capital Corporation, OBDC II told investors in a letter dated November 5, 2025 and filed with the SEC that "until the consummation of the proposed merger, OBDC II does not anticipate conducting additional tender offers." The two companies terminated the merger agreement effective November 18, 2025; their joint press release of November 19, 2025 said the decision followed management's recommendation "given current market conditions" and that, subject to board approval, OBDC II planned to reinstate its tender program in the first quarter of 2026.

Instead, in a Form 8-K dated February 17, 2026, OBDC II announced that it intended to make a special cash return-of-capital distribution of up to approximately 30% of its net asset value as of December 31, 2025, payable on or before March 31, 2026, subject to board approval; that its board had terminated the dividend reinvestment plan; and that it would prioritize quarterly return-of-capital distributions "intended to replace quarterly tender offers," funded by repayments, asset sales or strategic transactions. The filing described loan sale agreements, signed on February 18, 2026, with buyers it described as vehicles owned by public pension or insurance investors. Bloomberg reported on February 19, 2026 that Blue Owl had sold about $1.4 billion of direct-lending investments across three funds and that OBDC II investors would no longer be able to redeem shares on a quarterly basis.

On March 6, 2026, Saba Capital Management and Cox Capital Partners, which said they are not affiliated with OBDC II or its adviser, commenced a tender offer for up to 8,000,000 OBDC II shares, about 6.9% of shares outstanding, at $3.80 per share in cash, scheduled to expire on April 24, 2026. Their press release described the price as a 34.9% discount to the dividend reinvestment plan issuance value per share disclosed by OBDC II on February 26, 2026, less the return-of-capital distribution expected to be paid on or before March 31, 2026.

The diligence lesson: the mechanism by which a perpetual vehicle provides liquidity is itself subject to change by the board. Tender offers became return-of-capital distributions; the timing of liquidity shifted from investor-initiated to manager-paced; and an unaffiliated third party offered immediate liquidity at a steep discount. Expect questions on what the governing documents allow the board to change without a shareholder vote, and what precedent exists in the manager's other vehicles.

The regulatory backdrop

In its 2026 examination priorities, released on November 17, 2025, the SEC Division of Examinations said that, in reviewing investment advisers' adherence to their fiduciary obligations, it would focus on investment products including "alternative investments (e.g., private credit and private funds with investment lock-up for extended periods)", and listed among its developing areas of interest "certain RICs that use complex strategies and/or have significant holdings of less liquid or illiquid investments (e.g., closed end funds)". Managers should expect family offices, and the RIAs that advise them, to ask how examination-ready the manager's valuation, liquidity and conflicts documentation is.

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Part VI: What family office due diligence on credit looks like in 2026

A large office with a dedicated credit team may run diligence comparable to an endowment's; a smaller office may rely on an outsourced CIO or RIA. Either way, managers should be ready to answer the questions below in writing, before being asked.

Structure and liquidity

• Which rulebook applies? Private fund, BDC, interval fund under Rule 23c-3, or tender-offer fund under Rule 13e-4.
• What exactly is the liquidity commitment? Mandatory or discretionary; the offer percentage; how oversubscription is handled; and the board's power to suspend, change or replace the mechanism.
• What is the investor base? Concentration of the largest holders, share held through wealth platforms versus institutions, and history of tender requests as a percentage of shares for each quarter since inception.
• How have past tenders been funded? Subscriptions, repayments, borrowings or loan sales.
• What would a sustained queue do to the portfolio? A stress scenario showing leverage, liquidity and portfolio composition if tenders run at double the cap for four consecutive quarters.

Valuation

• Who marks the book? Board or valuation designee under Rule 2a-5 for registered funds and BDCs; the valuation policy and any independent valuation agent for private funds.
• What share of the portfolio is independently valued each quarter?
• Mark history for the largest positions, including any position that moved by a large amount in a single quarter, and the explanation.
• Payment-in-kind exposure: how much income is accrued but not received in cash, how it has trended, and whether it is included in the incentive fee base.

Leverage

• Current asset coverage ratio for BDCs, the date and route of any election of the 150% requirement, and the fund's internal leverage target.
• Sensitivity analysis: the decline in asset values that would push the fund to its asset coverage limit or to a covenant breach under its credit facilities.
• Structure of borrowings: maturity profile and any mark-to-market or margin provisions.

Fees

• The full stack, expressed as a single all-in cost on net assets, with interest expense shown separately.
• Incentive fee mechanics: hurdle, look-back, catch-up, treatment of PIK income and, for BDCs, the capital gains fee under Section 205(b)(3).
• Share class availability at the family's ticket size, and any fee break for SMAs or co-investment rights.

Portfolio and underwriting

• Non-accruals and realized losses by vintage, with definitions.
• Sponsor versus non-sponsor lending, and how the manager's documentation and covenant terms differ between them.
• For asset-based finance: collateral verification procedures, borrowing base audits, controls against double-pledging, and monitoring of borrowers' off-balance-sheet financing, the specific failure points highlighted by Tricolor and First Brands.

Alignment and governance

• Co-investment allocation: which SEC co-investment order the manager relies on, how scarce deals are allocated among the commingled fund, SMAs and co-investors, and how conflicts are documented.
• Manager and employee capital in the vehicle being offered, not only in the firm's flagship.
• Examination readiness: how the manager has responded to the SEC's stated focus on private credit and on registered funds with significant less liquid holdings.

The family's own constraints

A careful office also runs diligence on itself: it maps expected cash needs (capital calls, taxes, philanthropic pledges, family distributions, operating business needs) against the realistic liquidity of each credit holding under stress, reviews the tax character of each vehicle's income with its own advisers, and decides how much of its allocation it will hold in pooled vehicles where other investors' behavior determines its liquidity. Managers and RIAs that help with that exercise make the family's decision easier.

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The intelligence implication

The published bank surveys show family office credit allocations still modest, and in the UBS and Goldman Sachs data, rising. What the 2025-2026 stress points change is the conversation: the vehicle now has to be underwritten as carefully as the loans, with liquidity terms, valuation governance and fee mechanics treated as first-order risks.

For credit managers, that means three practical shifts:

Segment family offices by how they hold credit, not by how much wealth they have. An office that runs SMAs and co-investments needs a different conversation, and a different product, from one that holds a perpetual BDC through its RIA. The RIA directory and family office directory can help map which offices work with which advisers.

Lead with the stress case. A committee will build the downside scenario whether the manager provides it or not. The manager who arrives with tender history, mark history, PIK trends, leverage sensitivity and a clear statement of which rulebook governs liquidity starts from a stronger position than one who arrives with a yield.

Treat the RIA as a co-underwriter. Where a family office uses an RIA or outsourced CIO, that adviser may run much of the diligence described above, under its own fiduciary obligations and the SEC's examination focus on private credit. Equipping the adviser with the same documentation the family office would request directly is the practical path to an allocation.

For more on how we build adviser and family office profiles from public filings, see our data methodology.

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Key sources

• Investment Company Act of 1940, Section 55(a), 15 U.S.C. 80a-54
• Investment Company Act of 1940, Section 61(a), 15 U.S.C. 80a-60
• Small Business Credit Availability Act, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Pub. L. 115-141, Div. S, Title VIII, Section 802 (Skadden summary, April 2018)
• SEC Rule 23c-3, 17 CFR 270.23c-3
• SEC Rule 13e-4, 17 CFR 240.13e-4, and Rule 14e-1, 17 CFR 240.14e-1
• SEC Rule 2a-5, 17 CFR 270.2a-5
• Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Section 205(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. 80b-5
• SEC order, FS Credit Opportunities Corp. et al., Release No. IC-35561 (April 29, 2025) (Dechert summary, 2025)
• SEC Division of Examinations, 2026 Examination Priorities (November 17, 2025)
• UBS, Global Family Office Report 2025
• Goldman Sachs, Family Office Investment Insights: Adapting to the Terrain (2025)
• J.P. Morgan Private Bank, 2026 Global Family Office Report (as summarized by Chief Investment Officer, 2026)
• Blue Owl Capital Corporation II, investor letter of November 5, 2025 (filed with the SEC under Rule 425); Blue Owl Capital Corporation and Blue Owl Capital Corporation II, joint press release on termination of merger (November 19, 2025, Form 8-K Exhibit 99.1)
• Blue Owl Capital Corporation II, Form 8-K (date of report February 17, 2026)
• Saba Capital Management and Cox Capital Partners, tender offer press release for OBDC II shares (March 6, 2026), SEC EDGAR
• BlackRock TCP Capital Corp., fourth-quarter 2025 and first-quarter 2026 results releases (2026)
• Bloomberg, "Blue Owl Halts Redemptions on Private Credit Retail Fund" (February 19, 2026)
• Reuters, "Blackstone Private Credit Fund maintains 5% cap as redemption requests remain high" (September 3, 2026)
• SEC Division of Examinations, Fiscal Year 2026 Examination Priorities report
• SEC, Press Release 2026-77, charges against former Tricolor executives (August 18, 2026); US Attorney's Office, Southern District of New York, Tricolor charges (December 2025)
• Bloomberg News, First Brands bankruptcy filing (September 29, 2025); Associated Press, First Brands executives indicted (January 29, 2026)
• Cleary Gottlieb, "Tricolor: The Road to Ruin" (2025); Financier Worldwide, "First Brands enters Chapter 11" (2025)

Wealthmetrica provides intelligence on investment advisers, family offices and the people who run them. This analysis draws on public regulatory filings, statutes and published research; it is not legal, tax, or investment advice.